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THE RELATIONSHIP OF ANTITRUST
POLICY AND TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS*
JAMES T. HALVERSON**
The philosophy behind our antitrust laws is that the national econ-
omy will be invigorated by free and open competition. The premise
is that
unrestrained interaction of competitive forces will yield the best alloca-
tion of our economic resources, the lowest prices, the highest quality
and the greatest material progress, while at the same time providing an
environment conducive to the preservation of our democratic political
and social institutions.1
The objective of antitrust law is to ensure that the natural forces of
competition are permitted to work, free of artificial restraints and the
exercise of excessive monopoly power.
One tenet of competition policy that has received somewhat less anti-
trust attention than others is that competition promotes efficiency by
rewarding cost-cutting innovation and encouraging technological devel-
opment. It is the purpose of this Commentary to explore, in a prelim-
inary fashion, the relationship of antitrust policy and technological inno-
vation and to suggest circumstances under which the antitrust laws may
lend themselves to the enhancement of opportunities for technological
change and progress.
Certainly, in this country, we can look back on nearly a century of
outstanding technological development since the advent of our antitrust
system in the late nineteenth century. In addition to making new and
better products available for consumer selection, technological progress
is such an important factor in our society that it can be viewed as a
basic indicator of the country's economic performance. 2
Despite the obvious fact that competition and technological develop-
* This Commentary is based on a speech delivered by Mr. Halverson before the
FBA-BNA Briefing Conference in Washington, D.C., June 7, 1974.
** Member of the District of Columbia and Minnesota Bars. Formerly, Director
of the Bureau of Competition, Federal Trade Commission. B.A., 1962, LL.B., 1965,
Harvard University.
1. Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958).
2. See 3. BAN, INDusnt1AL ORGANIZATION 12 (1959).
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ment are both important aspects of our economic system, the proper
relationship b~etween antitrust law and policies designed to promote
technological development is not so obvious. The possibility of conflict
is nowhere more vividly illustrated than in the parallel development of
our patent and antitrust laws. On the one hand, we reward the in-
ventor by granting him a limited and temporary monopoly on a patenta-
ble invention; on the other, we vigorously enforce our antitrust laws
in order to confine the economic effects of that monopoly to a specific
market and to a limited period of time. The uncertainty that still re-
mains in defining the patent-antitrust relationship, while not the subject
of this paper, attests to the difficulties involved in attempting to balance
these sometimes conflicting patent and antitrust policies. 3
The heart of the antitrust-technology problem lies not, however, in
a conflict between two bodies of substantive law, but in the related eco-
nomic questions concerning the effect of market structure on innova-
tion and the effect of innovation on competition. This Commentary
will address the problem, first, by summarizing the existing theories of
the relationship between market structure and technological progress,
and second, by examining how innovation can affect competition.
I. THE EFFECT OF CONCENTRATION AND FIRM SIZE4 ON THE
RATE OF PRODUCT INNOVATION AND INTRODUCTION
A. A Priori Theories
The traditional antitrust viewpoint has been that material progress
and product innovation are not only consistent with a competitive mar-
ket structure but also reliant upon it. This attitude is well expressed
by Judge Wyzanski in United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp.:'
What appears to the outsider to be a sensible, prudent, nay even a pro-
gressive policy of the monopolist, may in fact reflect a lower scale of
adventurousness and less intelligent risk-taking than would be the case
if the enterprise were forced to respond to a stronger industrial dhal-
.3. See generally ATroRNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMrrrEE TO STUDy THp
ANTITRUST LAWS, REPORT 223-6Q (1955).
4. It is important here to distinguish between firm size and market power. A
firm's size is determined by the gross level of its business activities, often measured by
its sales and assets. Market power is best reflected in a firm's ability to control mar-
ket prices. While bigness and market power may coincide, bigness alone is no guaran.
tee that a firm can exercise market power. For example, a widely diversified firm may
be large, but not be active enough in any single market to hold much market power.
5. 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953), affd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
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lenge. Some truth lurks in the cynical remark that not high profits but a
quiet life is the chief reward of monopoly power.6
Although the judge was discussing innovation in the framework of a
monopolization case, his opinion typifies a common suspicion that large
amounts of market power can be a disincentive to development of new
products and processes. Whether this suspicion is well-founded is es-
sentially an economic question. If economic theory or empirical proof
were to show a positive correlation between innovation and market con-
centration or firm size, some aspects of antitrust policy might require
rethinking-keeping in mind, however, that innovation is but one goal
of competition policy.
The relationship between innovation and firm size or concentration
has been the subject of considerable economic study.7 While it would
be impossible here to give comprehensive treatment to the numerous
theories and studies that have been done, a brief discussion of the lit-
erature is in order. Traditional economic theory is reflected in the
comment of John Stuart Mill that "to be protected against competition
is to be protected in idleness, in mental dullness." s  The traditional
view is not without its dissenters, however. For example, Professor
Joseph A. Schumpeter theorized that the large and prosperous monop-
olist, rather than the lean, competition-hardened firm, is typically the
most effective vehicle for progress.' He believed that a firm which
can draw on the surpluses accumulated through higher than competitive
returns and which can expect a monopolist's return on its investment
in research and development is more likely to incur the risk and ex-
pense of invention than the business which realizes only competitive
profits.10
6. Id. at 347.
7. See, e.g., Comanor, Research and Technical Change in the Pharmaceutical In-
dustry, 47 REV. ECON. & STATISTICS 182 (1965); Hamberg, Size of Firm, Oligopoly and
Research: The Evidence, 30 CAN. J. ECON. & POL. ScL 62 (1964); Mansfield, Size of
Firm, Market Structure and Innovation, 71 J. POL. ECON. 556 (1963); Markham, Market
Structure, Business Conduct, and Innovation, 55 AM. ECON. REv. 323 (Supp. 1965);
Scherer, Firm Size, Market Structure, Opportunity and the Output of Patented Inven-
tions, 55 AM. ECON. REv. 1097, 1103-14 (1965); Worley, Industrial Research and New
Competition, 69 J. POL. EcoN. 183 (1961). For an excellent summary of the research
in this field, see Markham, Market Concentration and Innovation, in COLUMBIA LAW
SCHOOL CONFERENCE ON INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION (1974).
8. J. MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITCAL ECONOMY 299 (rev. ed. 1900); see J. CLARK,
ESSENTIALS OF ECONOMIC THEORY 374 (1907).
9. J. SCHu PETER, CAPrrALIsM, SocIALIsM, m DEm oCRAcy (1950).
10. Professor Schumpeter's theory finds some support in Professor John Kenneth
Vol. 1975:4091
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B. Empirical Theories
Unable to agree on a priori theories of the relationship between firm
size or concentration and innovation, economists have turned to em-
pirical methods. 1 The resulting studies fall generally into two cate-
gories: (1) those testing correlations between firm size and innovation
and (2) those examining the relationship between market concentra-
tion and technological development. 12
1. Firm Size and Innovation
Professor Frederic Scherer has observed that there is no ideal firm
size for innovation.'" Very small firms have contributed heavily to the
initial, inexpensive stages of the innovative process. On the other
hand, the development and application of new ideas can be very ex-
pensive and, in some instances, can be accomplished only by a firm
with substantial financial resources. Reviewing the empirical evi-
dence, Scherer concludes that increases in firm size can, up to a certain
point (roughly $75 million to $200 million in annual sales 4), enhance
progressiveness, but further increases beyond that size tend to retard
Galbraith's belief that all the inexpensive innovations have been made and that the fi-
nancial resources of the big firm are required for further progress. J. GALBRAITH,
AiMRCAN CArr A IsM 86-87 (1956). It should be noted, however, that even if one ac-
cepts this thesis about firm size, one does not necessarily reject competition as a stimulus
to innovation.
11. See, e.g., Comanor, Market Structure, Product Differentiation and Industrial Re-
search, 81 Q.I. EcON. 639 (1967); Grabowski, The Determinants of Industrial Research
and Development: A Study of the Chemical Drug and Petroleum Industries, 76 J. FOL.
EcoN. 292, 297-306 (1968); Horowitz, Firm Size and Research Activity, 29 S. EcON.
J. 298, 298-301 (1962); Mansfield, supra note 7; Scherer, supra note 7. For an excel-
lent summary of th6 research in this field, see Markham, Market Concentration and In-
novation, supra note 7.
12. It is important to recognize that there is no perfectly satisfactory measurement
of progressiveness. See generally F. ScnRE, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCURE AND Eco-
NOMIC PERFoRmANcE 357 (1971) [hereinafter cited as INDUSTRIAL MARKET SmOuc-
TuREi. Economists have typically looked either to investment in research and develop-
ment or the number of patents acquired as rough indicia of progressiveness. One short-
coming of such methods is that they look only to the initial stages of the innovative
process. The invention and patenting of new products and processes are several steps
removed from actual introduction or implementation. Economic policy must be con-
cerned not only with the market factors that promote inventiveness, but also with the
factors that are conducive to the commercial application of new technology.
13. INDUSRIAL MARKET S-RucruRE 352-57.
14. Scherer's estimations were made in terms of 1955 dollars and therefore would
require adjustment for practical application today.
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technological development. 15 This approach assumes that economic pro-
gressiveness is sufficiently homogeneous to be measured on an aggregate
basis. Such an aggregate approach, however, does not reflect the sub-
stantially different kinds of technological progress contributed by firms
of greatly varying sizes. For example, development of new energy tech-
nologies and the successful completion of the construction of new types
of energy enrichment or production facilities, such as nuclear enrichment
and reactor facilities, will require enormous resources for technological
development.'8
2. Market Power and Innovation
A number of studies have attempted to test Schumpeter's thesis that
concentration provides a better environment for technological progress
than does competition. Although there is considerable diversity in the
methods used, those studies generally support the conclusion that there
is at least a weak, positive correlation between concentration and inno-
vation.17
Before market power is heralded as the "mother of invention," con-
sideration should be given to the possibility that technological progress
produces concentration rather than itself being the result of oligopoly."'
A subsequent section of this Commentary will touch upon the ways in
which technological innovations allegedly have been abused with the
purpose and effect of reducing or preventing competition in various in-
dustries. From a broader perspective, rapid progress may inevitably
provide a favorable climate for concentration because it is the large
firm, with its substantial resources, that is often best able to acquire,
15. INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRucTuRE 357-62.
16. See E. SINGER, ANTITRUST ECONOMICS: SELECTED LEGAL CASES AN ECONOMIC
MoDELs 5-6 (1968).
17. See, e.g., Hamberg, supra note 7; Horowitz, supra note 11. Based upon his
research in the field, however, Professor Scherer has concluded:
Technological vigor appears to increase with concentration mainly at the rela-
tively low levels of concentration. Where the four-firm concentration ratio
exceeds 50%-55%, additional market power is probably not conducive to more
vigorous technological efforts and may be downright stultifying.
Scherer, Market Structure and the Employment of Scientists and Engineers, AM. ECON.
REv. 530 (1967). Scherer has also concluded that the effect of concentration on tech-
nological progressiveness is less important in "high opportunity" industries (i.e. those
experiencing rapid technological change) than in "low opportunity" fields. ImuSTmRAL
MARKET STRucruRE 375.
18. See Phillips, Patents, Potential Competition and Technical Progress, 56 AM.
EcoN. Rnv. 301 (Supp. 1966).
Vol. 1975:409] 413
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employ, and market new technology, even though the large firm may
not be innovative in its own right. The smaller firm simply may be
unable to afford to implement the new processes or products.
C. Retention of Present Antitrust Policy
These economic observations of the different kinds of technological
progress do not argue for any dramatic alteration of traditional anti-
trust policy. The conclusion is inescapable that technological progressive-
ness depends more on the characteristics of individual firms and markets
than on firm size or concentration per se. Thus the most effective ap-
proach would seem to be to continue treating each industry as an individ-
ual entity and to make policy judgments concerning antitrust enforce-
ment on a case-by-case basis.19
Because even the most dramatic antitrust remedies do not propose
the re-creation of atomistic market structures, it seems -highly unlikely
that current antitrust enforcement remedies have significantly impeded
innovation in any industry. Furthermore, it is important to remember
and consider that present antitrust policy has as its basis a number of
goals in addition to the encouragement of technological development.20
In the absence of convincing evidence that current policy has a strong
detrimental effect on technological progressiveness, policy changes that
sacrifice other important goals would seem unwarranted.
H'. THm EFFECT OF TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT
ON MARKET STRUCTURE
Obviously, product and process innovation can be dramatically pro-
competitive. The Polaroid Corporation is only one example of a firm
that became a successful new entrant largely by introducing a new
product. Technological developments permitting competition between
products that formerly were not interchangeable and new processes bring-
19. "After all Schumpeter only argued that any indiscriminate assault on bigness
and market power taken out of their evolutionary context, would deprive the capitalistic
process of its source of progress." Markham, Market Concentration and Innovation,
supra note 7, at 39 (emphasis added).
20. Among the other goals of antitrust policy are the following:
a) efficiency in the use of resources;
b) maintenance of competition as a market control mechanism; and
c) establishment of a standard of business conduct.
See C. KAYsEN & D. TuRnNE ANn usr POLICY 3-22 (1959).
[Vol. 1975:409
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ing cost savings to manufacturers can also stimulate pro-competitive ef-
fects. 21
A. New Products and Processes as Barriers to Entry
Less obvious, perhaps, are the barriers to entry that may be erected
as new technology is developed and accumulated by the existing firms
in an industry. 2 New products and processes, based in whole or in
part on secret know-how,23 can present formidable barriers to others.
If a new or improved product of an established firm is of superior qual-
ity or versatility, sizeable segments of the buying public may be unwill-
ing to consider older products as reasonable substitutes. If substantial
expertise or know-how is necessary to develop and manufacture the
novel superior product at a low cost and on a production-line basis,
other firms desiring to make the product may be forced to undertake,
at considerable expense, extensive research and development in an at-
tempt to discover their own methods of production. This process is
the essence of the concept of technological progressiveness and is con-
sistent with competition goals if the situation is not abused by industry
leaders.24
A new process may enable an established firm to produce existing
products more efficiently and, therefore, at a lower cost. In these cir-
cumstances, a new firm may be deprived of one of the most effective
21. See INDusnIAL MARKET STRUCTrJm 215.
22. When the term "barriers to entry" is used in this Commentary, it should be un-
derstood as embracing more than just those factors discouraging de novo entry. It also
refers to those obstacles preventing firms already in the market from becoming effective
competitors. The extent of such barriers partially determines how far the dominant
firms in a market may deviate from competitive performance standards without risking
competitive retaliation by either new entrants or smaller existing firms.
23. "Know-how" has been defined as "any information of peculiar value to its
owner, not protected by patent, and not generally known or accessible to everyone." 2
R. CALLUAN, UNFAiR CoMPETrrIoN, TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIES § 52.1, at 379
(1968).
In the renegotiated consent order in Xerox Corporation, No. 8909 (F.T.C., complaint
issued Jan. 16, 1973) "know-how" was defined as
all written materials used by Xerox Corporation in manufacturing, refurbish-
ing, recondition retrofitting and servicing its office copier products. . includ-
ing but not limited to blueprints, drawings, formulae, manuals, process descrip-
tions, production methods, specifications, quality control and test standards and
computer programs.
BNA ANTrRUST TRADE REP. No. 710, at E-1, E-2 (April 22, 1975), order finalized,
BNA ANTIrRusT TRADE REP. No. 725, at A-5 (Aug. 5, 1975).
24. See INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRuCTURE 384-89.
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means of increasing its market share-that is, price competition. Fac-
ing a cost disadvantage, the newcomer who undersells does so only at
the pleasure of the industry leader, which retains the power to assert
its competitive advantage whenever it perceives that its leadership is
imperiled. Even if the established firm does not meet or beat the price
of the new entrant, it may, nevertheless, reap a larger than competitive
profit for an indefinite period.25 The newcomer, as in the case of prod-
uct innovations, will probably be forced to expend the funds necessary
to emulate the new process.
Even if the new product or processes can be imitated, however, the
imitation may only be achieved at a higher cost. If this is the situation,
a barrier to effective competition is present. Again, this may simply
be the natural concomitant of effective innovation by the industry
leader.
The smaller, less powerful firm still faces substantial problems, even
assuming that it is prepared to spend the extra amounts of money for
technology. The primary difficulty is that the firm is playing catch-
up with the industry leaders.2 Starting at a disadvantage, the smaller
firm cannot challenge the industry leaders merely by equaling the larger
firms' expenditures and inventiveness. If it simply builds on its knowl-
edge of the pertinent art, the smaller firm may find itself forever trail-
ing behind the leaders at the same distance. In summary, the distance
between the newcomer and the established firm is one manifesta-
tion of the competition barrier that the older firm may erect by
accumulating its know-how. Although the new firm may eventually
develop the expertise for manufacturing today's products at reasonable
costs, it may very well find that these products mean little in the mar-
ketplace of tomorrow.2"
The evidence is unequivocal; technological change inherently makes
market entry more difficult except where the new technology is freely
available.2" To the extent that an innovative firm inevitably enjoys a
competitive advantage, the concomitant barriers to effective competi-
tion should present no antitrust problems. Present antitrust policy does
25. Id. at 219-24.
26. The small or new firm may also face substantial cost disadvantages. In many
instances, the total cost of new technology may be as great, or nearly as great, for a
small firm as for a large one. Because the small firm has fewer units of output over
which to spread fixed costs, its unit costs will often be higher than those of the big firm.
See Honeywell Inc. v. Sperry Rand Corp., 1974 Trade Cas. 95,875 (D. Minn. 1973).
27. See generally IhDuSTRaWL MARKET STRUrnrnE 368.
[Vol. 1975:409
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not deny a progressive firm the fruits of its efforts.29 Antitrust prob-
lems do arise, however, when a firm abuses technological advantages
with the purpose or effect of injuring competitors and discouraging new
entry.
The electronic data processing (EDP) industry provides a clear ex-
ample of the barriers that know-how can pose to a new entrant. In
1956, Sperry Rand and IBM, who held between them approximately
ninety-five percent of the EDP market, reached an agreement on the
cross-licensing of existing and future patents and on the sharing of all
EDP know-how in their possession. Honeywell later filed a suit against
Sperry Rand for violations of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Antitrust
Act,30 based, in part, on the agreement executed with IBM. Plaintiff
argued that the agreement was, in effect, a technological merger be-
tween the two dominant firms in the EDP market. Finding that the agree-
ment was a restraint of trade in violation of section 1, the district court
noted that IBM and Sperry Rand had exchanged information that no
other EDP firm had seen in an industry in which technology was crucial
and at a time when the two exchanging parties heavily dominated the
industry.3'
28. Of course, the very purpose behind the patent laws is to promote innovation by
allowing the invention a period of exclusive exploitation. Nevertheless, industry-wide
sharing of innovations can occur in a number of situations. For example, if the innova-
tion is accomplished in a government laboratory or under a government research grant,
information may be available to all applicants. Typical is the HEW regulation that em-
powers and, under certain circumstances, requires the Assistant Secretary to assure that
inventions arising under a Department research grant are made publicly available on rea-
sonable terms. 45 C.F.R. § 8 (1974). Another comparable situation occurs when the
inventing firm, as part of the remedy in an antitrust case or consent settlement, is or-
dered to share technology. See, e.g., United States v. National Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319
(1947); Bell & Howell Co. v. Eastman Kodak Co., Civil No. 73-35 (N.D. Ill., July 8,
1974) (consent settlement), described in BNA ANrus'r TRADn REP. No. 674, at A-9
(July 30, 1974); Xerox Corp., No. 8909 (F.T.C., July 30, 1975) (consent order), de-
scribed in BNA ANirrRusT TRADE REP. No. 725, at A-5 (Aug. 5, 1975).
29. See United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass.
1953), affd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954):
[Tihe defendant may escape statutory liability if it bears the burden of proving
that it owes its monopoly solely to superior skill, superior products, natural ad-
vantages, (including accessibility to raw materials or markets), economic or
technological efficiency, (including scientific research), low margins of profit
maintained permanently and without discrimination, or licenses conferred by,
and used within, the limits of law, (including patents on one's own inventions,
or franchises granted directly to the enterprise by a public authority).
Id. at 342 (emphasis added).
30. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1970).
31. Honeywell Inc. v. Sperry Rand Corp., 1974 Trade Cas. 95,875 (D. Minn. 1973).
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The court also found that the agreement permitted each company
to consider incorporating the techniques of the other into its own equip-
ment. By reviewing and studying the technical information gained
under the 1956 agreement, Sperry Rand and IBM were better able to
evaluate the options available to each of them and to decide what
equipment to build and what method to use in building it. Such oppor-
tunities involved time and cost-saving shortcuts in the evaluation and
selection of alternate routes. Existing EDP firms and potential
entrants were then forced to compete against the combined technical
portfolio of the two giants in the industry. Sperry Rand had assured
itself that others would confront the technological disadvantage of not
having access to the exclusively traded know-how and would, therefore,
have to sustain high research and development costs to duplicate efforts
of the two parties.
The district court found that the agreement had permitted Sperry
Rand and IBM to maintain a comfortable technological lead over the
small companies who had not participated in the bilateral exchange.
And indeed, the small firms had lost valuable time reinventing the inno-
vations of the two industry leaders. As a result of the IBM-Sperry Rand
agreement, a barrier was erected in the face of existing competitors
and new entrants. Sperry Rand and IBM were able to concentrate on
more advanced products and to keep them in reserve until competi-
tion was about to, or did, introduce similar ideas to the market. Thus,
the case presented a classic example of the "catch-up" problem.
That control of technology can sometimes be used to achieve market
power has been highlighted by the recently settled Federal Trade Com-
mission action against Xerox Corporation. 2 In essence, the com-
plaint alleged that Xerox monopolized the office copier industry pri-
marily by accumulating a patent portfolio that stood as an imposing
barrier to entry. Xerox was also charged with maintaining and exploit-
ing a patent portfolio and licensing posture in order to channel com-
petitors into manufacturing and selling low-speed and coated-paper
32. Xerox Corp., No. 8909 (F.T.C., filed Jan. 16, 1973). The original provisional
consent order was rejected in February 1975 by the Federal Trade Commission following
widespread criticism by Xerox' competitors that the order did not go far enough. The
renegotiated settlement, which gives competitors freer access to Xerox' portfolio of office
copier patents and Xerox' know-how than the original settlement, will require Xerox to
share much of its office copier technology. BNA ANTrTRUST TR.DF RP. No. 725, at
A-5 (Aug. 5, 1975).
[Vol. 1975:409
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copiers while reserving the competitively more important high-speed
and plain-paper copier market for itself.
B. Product Changes and Proliferation as Barriers to Trade
A different problem may be presented by the introduction of rela-
tively minor product changes. Antitrust policy must be concerned with
the possibility that certain insubstantial product modifications do not
represent true progress, but may nevertheless seriously threaten com-
petition. Trivial modifications may, when aided by intensive advertis-
ing, convince the consumer that a significant, desirable innovation has
been introduced. Some authorities have argued that by a series of minor
variations or style changes, a manufacturer (or a group of manufac-
turers) can thus make the products of competitors obsolete or can
compel competitors to incur the expense of frequent product modifica-
tions.3 On the other hand, this phenomenon may be a competitive re-
sponse to the rapidly changing tastes and preferences of American con-
sumers.
In its monopolization case against IBM, Control Data Corporation
touched upon the relationship between product changes and exclusion
of competition. 4 Control Data alleged that IBM had frequently and
unnecessarily introduced new models and model numbers and had ex-
ploited the customers' fear of computer obsolescence, thus injuring the
competitors of IBM. The premise of the charges was that, because
of IBM's market power, customers' expectations were largely based on
IBM's practices, and competitors had no choice but to meet those ex-
pectations.
Two recent suits against Kodak raise issues that are closely related
to style-change problems. 35 Although the two actions concern differ-
ent product markets, the focus of the complaint is the same in each
case. Basically, the plaintiffs allege that, because Kodak is the major
33. A number of articles have argued that the high barriers to entry into the auto-
mobile industry have resulted from the major manufacturers' practice of frequently
changing body styles. See, e.g., J. BmAN, BARRiERs To NEw COMPETrnION 298-
99 (1956); Note, Annual Style Change in the Automobile Industry as an Unfair Method
of Competition, 80 YALE L.J. 567, 586-92 (1971).
34. Control Data Corp. v. International Bus. Mach. Corp., Civil No. 3-68-312 (N.D.
Minn., Jan. 1973), described in BNA ANrrmusT TRADE REP. No. 596, at A-12 (Jan.
16, 1973) & BNA ANTITRUST TRADE REP. No. 388, at A-3 (Dec. 17, 1968).
35. GAF Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., Civil No. 73-1893 (S.D.N.Y., filed April
30, 1973); Bell & Howell Co. v. Eastman Kodak Co., Civil No. 73-35 (N.D. Ill., July
8, 1974), described in BNA ANTITRusT TRADE REP. No. 674, at A-9 (July 20, 1974)
& BNA AiNrrusT TRADE REP. No. 595, at A-4 (Jan. 9, 1973).
Vol. 1975:409] 419
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producer of photographic equipment and supplies, competing manu-
facturers must design their equipment and supplies to be compatible
with Kodak products. Allegedly, each time that Kodak modifies its
products, or its chemical formulae, its competitors' products become
obsolete. Thus, the other manufacturers' research and development bud-
gets are consumed, in large part, by efforts to adapt to Kodak technol-
ogy. The complaints allege, in effect, that Kodak aggravated the "catch-
up" dilemma of smaller firms by introducing product changes and timing
the changes in a way to injure competitors. The question raised by these
allegations is whether a company with a dominant market position en-
gaged in product changes for reasons motivated by the desire to satisfy
consumer tastes or improve the product technologically, or whether the
company made the changes simply because a smaller competitor was
about to "catch-up" technologically and the change would make it more
difficult for the competitor to increase its market position.
C. Adequacy of Present Antitrust Policy
The foregoing discussion has focused on the anticompetitive poten-
tial of technological abuses rather than concentrating on how antitrust
policy should be altered to deal with those abuses. This approach was
taken because the problem is considered to be a matter primarily for
the practitioner rather than the policymaker. Present antitrust policy
seems adequate to achieve the proper progress-competition trade-off."
The challenge lies in examining each industry to distinguish the legit-
imate rewards of true progress and innovation from the fruits of anti-
competitive conduct.
36. See Honeywell Inc. Y. Sperry Rand Corp., 1974 Trade Cas. 95,875 (D. Minn.
1973); cf. Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172
(1965); Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386 (1945); United States v.
United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953), af'd per curtam, 347
U.S. 521 (1954).
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